After the Reform Agenda, Delivery is the Test

UKREiiF has quickly become one of the most important fixtures in the UK development calendar. For many in the market, it has become a more relevant forum even than MIPIM, because it is so strongly rooted in public-private delivery: regeneration, infrastructure, housing, and local government.

This year the event brought together approximately 16,000+ delegates, 1,250 speakers and 150 exhibitors, and a busy fringe. The political presence was significant: Steve Reed, Matthew Pennycook and Rachel Reeves all attended, keen to show that the government understands the scale of the challenge facing developers.

The striking feature was the tone. Last year, there was a sense from ministers that planning reform would put the onus back on the market; this year, the sentiment was more realistic. From the industry’s point of view, there was an acceptance that the government has moved a long way on planning but that consents alone will not build homes.

Viability is the word of the moment

The word I heard most often was 'viability'. While that is not new, its place in the conversation has changed. Viability is no longer treated as a technical argument at the end of a planning process. It needs to be considered from the start: in land promotion, option agreements, development appraisals, infrastructure phasing and tenure strategy.

In practical terms, the value of a consent is judged less by the headline number of homes and more by whether those homes can be funded, built and absorbed. A site can have policy support and a planning route yet still fail if the land value expectation is wrong, the infrastructure burden is too front-loaded, or the sales market cannot support the pace of delivery.

Planning risk remains real. Permissions are not coming through quickly enough and local authority capacity is stretched. But the constraint is increasingly post-consent. Finance costs, build costs, regulatory costs, affordable housing exit routes, and absorption rates now decide whether a permission becomes a start on site.

Public money will need to work harder

It is well recognised that the government has put in place some serious measures. Matthew Pennycook used his UKREiiF speech to point to the £39 billion Social and Affordable Homes Programme, the £16 billion National Housing Bank, almost £100 million for local planning authority capacity and more than £600 million for construction skills. He referenced Homes England supporting more than 40,000 completions and leveraging £22.6 billion of private investment in the previous financial year.

Despite that, the question now is: how will those interventions be deployed? Homes England was highly visible at UKREiiF. Its new regional operating model (five Executive Regional Directors appointed to lead strengthened regional teams from 2026) and the National Housing Bank give it a stronger set of tools. But it is not an unlimited grant pot. It will use debt, equity and guarantees, which means projects still have to be investable. The challenge is to use public balance sheets to unlock difficult sites, not simply fill gaps that the market has already priced as unbridgeable.

There is some cautious optimism that its new regional operating model could help. Housing delivery problems are often rooted in local infrastructure, land values and markets and so a more regionally focused Homes England ought to be better placed to connect affordable housing funding, regeneration objectives, public land and private capital.

Tenure routes are under pressure

An issue that concerns many in today’s market is Section 106 affordable housing. For years, the economics of mixed-tenure development rested on developers providing affordable homes through S106 and Registered Providers (RPs) buying them, giving the developer an early receipt and helping unlock finance.

That position has weakened recently. While RPs have not withdrawn from development, they have less financial headroom – a result of cladding premiums, building safety, decarbonisation and damp and mould. The Regulator of Social Housing's 2025 Global Accounts show repairs and maintenance spend by large private providers reaching £10.0 billion, while EBITDA MRI interest cover fell to 87%. If a developer cannot find an RP to acquire the S106 homes, affordable housing can stall the whole scheme.

Build to Rent (BTR) was part of the same conversation. For mixed-tenure projects, BTR can provide a third route to delivery, alongside private sale and affordable housing. A single institutional buyer or funder can take numerous homes at once, improve cash flow, and support earlier delivery.

But BTR only works when it is considered early. The sector remains substantial: BPF data shows more than 147,670 completed BTR homes and a total completed-and-pipeline sector of around 303,000 homes by Q1 2026. Yet homes under construction were down 17% nationally year-on-year and starts were sharply lower. Capital is still available, but it is more selective. BTR is a useful delivery route, not a late-stage fix for a scheme that has already failed the viability test.

From ambition to delivery

There was also a strong undercurrent of local government reorganisation. For some authorities, it is a distraction from the day job. For others, it is creating urgency to get projects moving before structures change. Either way, it adds to the case for early commercial clarity.

This is where the private sector can help. Regeneration strategies often begin with a powerful ambition: more homes, better public realm, stronger town centres, infrastructure investment, and renewed confidence in place. But a vision is not the same as a deliverable project.

The private sector's role, and one that Carter Jonas often takes on, is to test that ambition against the market. Is the land value realistic? Can the infrastructure be phased? Will the affordable housing package attract an RP? Is there demand? Can the scheme absorb remediation, utilities, planning obligations, and finance costs? Where is the funding gap, and how might it be closed? The projects that move will be those that can answer those questions early.

The lesson I took from UKREiiF is not that the sector lacks ambition, but that ambition has to become fundable, consentable, and deliverable much earlier in the process. That is where development consultancy has a critical role: shaping projects before avoidable risk becomes embedded. We are at a challenging point in the market, but UKREiiF showed that the planning and development sector is up to that challenge.